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Abstroct
NASA Headquarters' Office of Advanced
Concepts and Technology (OACT) joined efforts
with Johnson Space Center's (JSC) Automation
and Robotics Division and Langley Research
Center's (LaRC) Information Systems Division to
capture the technologies developed during the
canceled NASA Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS)
program planned for use on Space Station
Freedom. The recent FTS Technology Capture
effort completed the build and testing of one flight
qualifiable ITS manipulator, deliverable to JSC's
Automation & Robotics Division for environmental
testing. The many robotic technologies
developed to meet the 30 year space environment
design requirements are discussed in this paper.
The manipulator properties were to allow
positioning control to one thousandths of an inch,
with zero actuator backlash over a temperature
range of -50 to +95 degrees C, and were to include
impedance control and inertial de-coupling. Safety
and reliability requirements are discussed that were
developed to allow a thirty year life in space with
minimum maintenance. The system had to meet
the safety requirements for hazardous payloads for
operation in the Shuttle Payload Bay during
demonstration test flights prior to Station use. A
brief description is contained on an Orbiter based
robotic experiment and operational application
using the dexterous FTS manipulator operating on
the end of the Shuttle Remote Manipulator
Systems (SRMS) from ground control.
Anticipated Mission Tasks
The original FTS concept for Space Station
Freedom (SSF) was to provide telerobotic
assistance to enhance crew activity and safety, and
:to reduce crew EVA (Extra Vehicular Activity)
activity. The first flight of the FTS manipulator
systems would demonstrate several candidate
tasks and would verify manipulator performance
parameters. These first flight tasks included
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Figure 1 - FTS Manipulator on Air Bearing Table
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unlocking a SSF Truss Joint, mating/de-mating a
fluidcoupling, contact following of a contour board,
demonstrating peg-in-hole assembly, and grasping
and moving a mass. Future tasks foreseen for the
FTS system IncludedORU (Orbit Replaceable Unit)
change-out, Hubble Space Telescope Servicing,
Gamma Ray Observatory refueling,and several in-
situ SSF servicing and maintenance tasks.
Operation of the FTS was planned to evolve from
teleoperaUon to fully autonomous execution of
many tasks. The FTS manipulator has been
assembled at Martin Madetta (see Rgure 1) and will
be delivered to NASA/JSC (Johnson Space
Center). Successful component tests Indicate a
manipulator which achieves unprecedented
performance specifications.
Currently anticipated tasks for dexterous space
manlpulators still focus on reducing EVAs as well
as enhancing crew activity and safety. The Space
Station (Freedom ?) plans to utilize a dexterous
manipulator, SPDM (Special Purpose Dexterous
Manipulator), on the SSRMS (Space Station
Remote Manipulator System) to perform
maintenance tasks such as replacement of ORUs.
A potential being Investigated for use on the
Space Shuttle in assistance with EVA worksite
setup and teardown. The first and last portion of
most EVAs consist of placing or retrieving PFRs
(Portable Foot Restraints), Tool Boards, and other
devices needed to support EVA tasks. Other
possible uses for dexterous manipulators Include
contingency use to avoid additional EVA crew
intervention. The FTS manipulator requirements
and designs are examples by which to assist in
understanding current dexterous manipulator
tasks and plans.
The wide range of FTS mission tasks combined
with the desire to evolve toward full autonomy
forced several extremely demanding
requirements. Some of these requirements may
be excessive to telerobotics community, but the
FTS requirements appear to have been created to
accommodate an open-ended evolution. This
operational evolution would not be Impeded by
functional limitations in the FTS manipulator
systems. Many of the FTS requirements
discussed in the following sections greatly
influenced the development cost and schedule of
the FTS manipulator. A recommendation arising
from the FTS program to remedy the possible
Impacts from such ambitious requirements is to
better analyze candidate robotic tasks. Based on
these task analyses, then weigh the operational
Impacts against development Impacts prior to
requirements definition.
Functional Reaulrements
The functional requirements of the FTS
manipulator involve environmental, performance,
safety, and resource effects. Many of these
requirements are driven by the space
environment, such as operation in thermal
extremes, the need for safety, and limited resource
availability (weight and power). Many of these
requirements, however, focus on the manipulator
and component functions to Insure superior
performance and ability to upgrade (evolution
toward autonomy).
The primary robotic function of the FTS
manipulator is that it move or manipulate objects in
zero-gravity. Because interchangeable end-
effectors were being considered, the manipulator
requirements specify the tool-plate as the point of
reference (see Figure 2 for ITS manipulator
dimensions and components.) The tool plate is
the attachment point for the wrist force/torque
sensor. A manipulated object's mass may be as
high as 37 slugs (1200 lb.) with the manipulator
able to move masses less that 2.8 slugs (90 lb.) at
velocities of 6 inch/second. Unloaded tool plate
velocity will be at least 24 inch/second. Accuracy
of tool-plate positioning relative to the manipulator
base frame must be within 1 inch and ± 3 degrees.
The manipulator must be able to resolve tool-plate
incremental motion within 0.001 inch and 0.01
degrees. (Of coarse, verification tests of such
extreme resolution specifications is costly.)
Additionally, repeatability must be within 0.005
inch and + 0.05 degrees with respect to the
manipulator base frame. To perform useful work,
the FTS manipulator was required to provide 20
pounds force and 20 foot-pounds torque output at
the tool plate in any direction and in any
manipulator configuration. These output force and
positioning requirements were to be utilized with
several control schemes Including joint-by-joint,
Cartesian, and impedance control.
To operate in space, the FTS manipulator had to
meet the shuttle safety requirementsas well as the
environmental extremes. The safety
requirements, as discussed later in this paper,
ensure Orbiter and crew safety through fault
tolerance. Safety is cited by Shattuck and Lowde
[1992] as "the single largest factor ddvlng the
system design." Safety and fault tolerance
requirements resulted in monitoring of joint and
Cartesian data, in checking of looptimes to ensure
proper functioning, In cross-strapping along
communication paths, and in the addition of a
hardwire control capability as a backup operational
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mode. Orbiter launch and landing Impart vibration
into the system which requires structural analysis
and testing. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
must be limited both from invading and from exiting
the manipulator systems. However, the most
demanding aspect of the space environment from
the FTS designer's view Is the thermal vacuum of
space. Operation in a hard vacuum (10-5 torr) and
over temperatures from -50°C to 95°C, with
directional heating and gradients, forced
innovative designs, careful material selection, and
extensive analysis.
Another consequence of the space environment
is operation in zero-gravity. Designing the
manipulator for a zero-g environment Impacts
structural, electromechanical, and electrical power
considerations and well as the control system
design. Because weight is a premium in space,
motors are chosen to provide torque's for zero-g
operation. This saves significant weight and
electrical power when compared to motors chosen
for ground-based operation. Smaller motors also
benefit the thermal control system. The structure
must also be lightweight,which increases flexibility
and lowers structural bending mode frequencies.
While being lightweight and more flexible, space
manipulators are expected to handle payloads
more massive than the manipulator. This
expectation Is far different from terrestrial
manipulators which usually handle payloads less
than 1/10 the manipulator weight. To maintain
stability and performance of the FTS system, a
10:1 ratio is maintained between the first bending
mode and the control bandwidth. This ratio
precludes use of high bandwidth PID servos used
in more massive, terrestrial manipulators. To
address the stabilityand performance Issues In the
FTS manipulator, the structure was designed for
stiffness (12 Hz first bending mode) and the
manipulator control has a 1.2 Hz bandwidth, an
Inertia decoupler, and joint-level position, velocity,
and torque servo control loops.
Manipulator Desl_an Technologies
Beyond safety, FTS manipulator design was driven
by the thermal environment and the positioning
performance specifications. Of course, each
manipulator subsystem was influenced by
additional constraints and specifications. The
following paragraphs describe the manipulator
subsystem designs and technologies developed
by Martin Marietta and its subcontractors to meet
the FTS requirements and specifications.
Manipulator subsystems discussed include
manipulator kinematic design, link structure,
actuators, control systems, and the end-of-arm
tooling.
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Figure 2 - Manipulator Dimensions & Components
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Manipulator K]nematics
A 7-DOF (degree-of-freedom) R-Y-P-P-P-Y-R
design Is used with the first Joint (shoulder roll)
utilized for task-dependent configuration
optimization. The outer 6 Joints are actively
controlled for coordinated output motion. The
kinematic design has minimal Jointoffsets and 90°
twist angles to simplifythe kinematics. The 6-DOF
kinematic arrangement, with three adjacent pitch
joints, provides a closed-form inverse kinematic
solution with few singularities within the
manipulator workspace. The singuladtles which
occur when the wrist roll or wrist yaw align with the
shoulder yaw are beyond the usual workspace of
the manipulator. Other singularities occurring at
joint limits and when the elbow passes over the
"home" position (see Figure 3), shown below, are
eliminated with mechanical and softwarejointtravel
limits. The 3 inch displacement of the elbow Jointis
to allow the arm to fold back on Itself for a greater
workspace.
The manipulator links provide structuralsupporl as
well as Joint controller electronics packaging and
thermal control. Packaging and thermal control
determined link sizes while fracture and stiffness
conslderaUons drove the structural design of the
links. A stiffness requirement of 1,000,000
pounds/foot and 1,000,000 foot-pounds/radian
resultedin a smallest structuralsafety marginwhich
exceeds 14, far greater than Shuttle requirement
for a t.4 factor of safety. Easy access to
electronics Is through side plates on the links. To
avoid the cost and complication of active cooling,
radiation is the pdmary thermal path. The controller
boards sit in slots within the links which provide
conduction paths to the link structure for radiation
to the environment. Figure 4 shows the links and
the computer cards which fit within the links. The
link designs use matedal coatings, mounting
hardware, and Kaptonllnconel film heaters to
maintain thermal control.
Actuators
The joint actuator designs, developed by Martin
Madetta and Schaeffer Magnetics, were also ddven
by positioning, performance, and thermal
demands. These high-performance, zero backlash
actuators each house a DC-motor, harmonic ddve
transmission, output torque sensor, output
position sensor, fail-safe brake, hard-stops, and
internally routed cabling. The design achieves
considerable commonalty between actuators.
Three sizes are used - one for the 3 shoulder
joints, one elbow joint, and one for the 3 wrist
Joints.
The DC-motors have brushless, delta-wound
stators with samarium cobalt rotors. This design
offers good thermal properties, low EMI, minimal
rotational losses, and linear torque-speed
relationships. Motor commutation signals are
generated from Hall Effect sensors, a second set
of which is Installed for redundancy. A secondary
set of windings within the stator, ddven via an
independent electrical path, provides at least 10%
rated torque and 0.5 degrees/second joint velocity
for operation of a backup mode. This degraded
mode of operation, commanded joint-by-joint
satisfies the need for safing the manipulator after
failure of a primary system. Fail-safe brakes
attached to the motor rotor shaft are spring-loaded
so that loss of power engages the brake. These
brakes may be released with an EVA release bolt,
which when turned 90° releases a cam on the
brake armature.
Harmonic ddves provide 100:1 backddvable gear
reduction In a compact volume. The harmonic
ddves were chosen for torsional stiffness and zero
backlash. Cup size is determined by joint torsional
stiffness requirements. In fact, because of the
relative flexibility of the harmonic ddve, all other
torsion members are considered dgld. Rather than
the standard Oldham coupling to the wave
generator, a specially designed cylindrical coupler
was used to eliminate backlash. Additionally, the
output Is coupled to a flange around the motor and
harmonic drive. This flange, mounted to large
duplex beadngs provides compactness, rigidity,
and an efficient load path to the output link.
y2 y$ y4
y0
Figure 3 - FTS Manipulator "Home" Position
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An analog torque loop is Implemented in the Joint
servos to accommodate the non-linear and high-
frequency affects of the harmonic ddves. Sensed
torque values come from an output torque sensor
embedded on the harmonic ddve output flange.
Strain gages are mounted to the spokes of the
titanium flange. This sensor placement isolates the
sensor from structural loads (bending), thus
primarily transmitting actuator torque. For effective
performance, this analog torque loop operates at
1500 Hz.
Like the manipulator structure, the actuator
housings and beadngs were designed for stiffness
and thermal stability. A standard beating steel,
440C stainless, is used for all bearings. Bearing
lubricant is Braycote 601, a liquid lubricant used in
space applications. Its very low vapor pressure
allows the actuator to be vented rather that sealed,
but was still designed to resist contamination and
assembly in a clean room. The motor beadngs are
deep-groove roller beadngs sized for the thrust
load of brake engagement and spdng pre-loaded
to minimize temperature sensitivity. The output
bearings are large diameter, duplex-pair, angular
contact beadngs (face-to-face mounting). These
beadngs share radial and thrust loads with another
duplex-pair on the other side of the actuator. An
exception is the wrist roll, which has a single,
duplex pair mounted back-to-back for better dgidity
against the bending moments of the full cantilever
load. Unfortunately, this back-to-back installation
has greater sensitivity to assembly misalignments.
This sensitivity may contribute to the excessive,
uncompensated fdction discovered dudng recent
wdst roll torque loop tests.
The actuator housings are aluminum and titanium.
Titanium is utilized near bearings. The similar
thermal properties of 440C stainless and 6AI-4V
titanium minimize temperature effects on beadng
pre-loads. These pre-loads were determined as a
compromise between stiffness and friction drag.
The actuator case was designed for thermal needs.
Motor and brake heat is dissipated to the ends or to
the casing and then radiated to the environment.
Like the links, the actuator design uses thermal
Isolation, matedal coatings, and internally mounted
film heaters to protect bearings from thermal
gradients. These gradients could adversely affect
actuator fdcUon and positioning accuracy.
The positioning and incremental motion
requirements call for encoder data within an arc-
minute which required position resolutions to 22-
bits. To meet this need, inductive encoders were
developed specifically for the FTS program by
Aerospace Controls Corporation. These encoders
have a fine and a coarse track used for incremental
and absolute position resolution, respectively.
Temperature effects on sensor accuracy were
discovered dudng thermal testing. These errors
were stable and repeatable with temperature, and
are thus correctable in software.
All cabling in the manipulator Is internally routed
through the links and actuators. Each actuator has
a cable passageway designed to eliminate twisting
Figure 4 - FTS Manipulator Links and Controller Cards
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of cabling, thus minimizing chafing opportunity.
The innovative cabling within these actuators Is of
Flat Conductor Cables (FCC), manufactured by
Tayco, Inc. FCC is used in space applications,but
for this application up to 34 layers of laminated
cables are used in a single actuator passageway.
The cables consist of altematlng layers of Kapton,
FEP, and photo etched copper conductors with a
vapor-deposited copper shield. These cables are
to operate from -50°C to 95°C through thousands
of cycles. These cables route serial data, video
signals, power, and discrete signals. Acceptance
tests of a few cables indicated minor lamination
problems apparently due to entrapped water
vapor. Investigation of the cable manufacture and
tests of additional cables indicated several areas for
possible change as well as a method for cable
repair. Recent cable tests to 100,000 mechanical
cycles over full temperature ranges verified
continued cable functionality.
Control Systems
The FTS manipulator control design provides 6-
DOF active control over a wide range of payloads
as well as Impedance control for stable contact.
The wide payload range specified for the FTS
manipulator causes the manipulator joints to
experience Inertial loads over several orders of
magnitude. These loads are induced by the
coupling which occurs between joints and affects
the trajectory-trackingaccuracy of the manipulator.
The position controller implemented in the FTS
manipulator compensates for these torques with a
model-based inertia decoupler. The feed-forward
decoupling scheme computes expected inertial
torques due to commanded motion and sums this
torque with the joint command. The position-
dependent inertia matdcas used to calculate these
torques are computed every 200 ms, a time
chosen as a compromise of accuracy and
computational burden.
In addition to the free-space performance
requirements, satisfied with the position controller
and inertial decoupler, the ITS manipulator must
provide stable contact with its Impedance control
(see Figure 5). The Impedance controller Is
position-based, that is, the manipulator and joints
are treated as actuators of Cartesian position.
Thus, end-effector force measurements are
transformed Into Cartesian motion commands
based on a desired output impedance. To
maintain stability dudng the transition from free-
space motion to contact, a Jointvelocity feedback
term Is included for 'augmented damping.' The
resulted lightly damped contact Insures stability,
but when contact is broken the free-space motion
becomes overdamped and sluggish. A feed-
forward velocity term is implemented to
compensate for this poor free-space response.
These control schemes, which increase the
complexity of the controller are designed to meet
the FTS frea-space motion, payload capacity, and
contact performance requirements.
Ememency Shutdown
An emergency shutdown (ESD) system is
embedded in the manipulator control architecture.
This system was implemented to provide active
control of hazards to meet the payload safety
requirement to be two-fault tolerant against
catastrophic hazards. The primary hazards in this
case are unplanned contact and excessive force
generation. The ESD approach is to use 3 control
levels to monitor joint and Cartesian positions and
velocities, comparing both commands and sensor
feedback. A separate ESD bus, which connects
the joint, manipulator, and power controllers, is the
path by which an ESD is initiated - removing power
from the manipulator systems. The first level
checks that commanded values are within
allowable limits both in the manipulator controller
and the joint controllers. The second level
monitorssafety criticalparameters such as position,
velocity, and torque with the joint controllers and
within the manipulator controller collision
avoidance routines. The final level of ESD
monitoringIs a check of redundantsafety critical
Decoupler
Cartesian
Position =rid
Orientation
Figure 5 - Manipulator Impedance Control Block Diagram
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parametersintheredundantmanipulatorcontroller
and in independent joint controllers.
In the event of an apparent failure, several possible
ESD actions may be automatically initiated. The
operator, of course, has a manual ESD to power off
the manipulator at any time. If monitored values are
elevated but do not pose immediate danger, a soft
stop is initiated by the control software. A soft stop
commands the manipulator to hold the current
position with brakes off (disengaged). An example
of a soft stop condition is a Cartesian manipulator
command which violatesa warning boundary near a
known obstacle. A hardware ESD is initiated by
any controller when an analog sensor value
exceeds its limit value - resulting in an ESD
notification on the ESD bus. These analog
comparisons are being performed at 1500 Hz. A
software ESD occurs when a controller CPU
detects an out-of-limit condition and signals the
power module over the Mil-Stdo1553B
communication bus. The power module then
initiates a combination ESD to power off the
manipulator. A combination ESD is detected by
software comparisons in the controllers and
initiates a software reset of a hardware limit value to
force a hardware ESD. All these ESD paths were
analyzed to determine reaction times to various
failures such as a joint runaway. Hardware ESDs
occur in 11 msec, combination ESDs occur in 30 to
206 msec, and a combination ESD may take up to
4026 msec for an over-temperature condition.
Griooer/End-of-Arm Toolina
The end-of-arm tooling built for the FTS
manipulator has a parallel jaw gripper and space for
later addition of an end-effector exchange
mechanism. This gripper and wrist mounted
camera and lights are shown in Figure 6. The
gripper fingers are a cruciform designed for
positive contact and retention. The gripper fingers
ride on a rack and pinion driven by a harmonic drive
transmission and a single DC-motor. A pair of fail-
safe brakes are installed to provide fault tolerance
against inadvertent release. Each of the two
brakes can withstand forces greater than expected
gripper forces (maximum anticipated load is 30 Ib,
brake hold is 50 Ib). Gripper forces are measured
by a torque sensor and also by motor currents.
The concern over inadvertent release also
impacted the design of planned task items. These
items were instrumented to insure positive grasp.
As a final safety measure, the gripper fingers are
attached with EVA compatible bolts which may be
removed on-orbit to release the gripper.
Safety Reoulrements
Robotic Manipulator Systems can provide the
capability to perform work and assist humans in
space as long as they are safe and reliable. The
space based requirements differ significantly from
Flgure 6 - End-of-Arm Toollng/Grlpper
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terrestrial based manipulators used in industryand
research. In most terrestrial robot Implementations,
the prime method for dealing with failures is to
keep workers out of the robot workspace when
active and by accepting the occasional parts
damage followinga failure due to high volume parts
fabrication. This approach is not acceptable for
space applicationswhere humans are Involved,the
effects are very high in costs or It's extreme
difficuHyto repair. These effects Impact the design
requirements for space manipulator systems.
Hazards and Controls
All manned space flight systems are assessed for
flight hazards their use would impose. From such
an assessment the causes of those hazards are
determined, and methods to control those hazards
are developed. To gain flight acceptance, multiple
levels of hazard control must be designed and
verified to assure the desired level and coverage of
controls. In the FTS system development, safe
control of hazardous operations forced additional
requirements in the design of the manipulator
system, its Interfaces with the Orbiter and the task
elements the F-I"Swas to interactwith.
The primary hazards associated with the FTS
manipulator operations and the three methods for
providingsafe control are as listed:
A) Unplanned contact or impact dudng operations
1) Operator and computer control to not
command unplanned contact.
2) Boundary management software oparatlon.
3) Redundant boundary management software
operation in the safety computer
B) Inadvertent release of hardware
1) Hardwired enable gripper brake power from
Independent switchin the aft flightdeck
2) Operator Interface Computer: (the aft flight
deck portable laptop computer) command to
release gdpper Brake #1
3) Hand controller switch to release gdpper
Brake #2
C) Failure to stow for safe Orbiter landing
1) Normal computer operations (With hardwired
control for added reliability)
2) Jettisonvia RMS (or EVA if time permits)
3) EVA operationsto stow orjettison
D) Excessive applied gripperforce or torque
1) Force control using gdppar force sensor
2) Current limiting ESD (Emergency shutdown
detection)
3) Redundant current limitingESD
E) Excessive applied manipulator force or torque
1) Normal controlwHhactive Cartesianload from
Jointtorque command
2) Cartesian force limiting, using wrist
force/torque sensor channel A
3) Redundant Cartesian force limiting, using
wristforce/torque sensor channel B.
Mission Ooeratlon To Control Hazards
Primary concerns in the design of space
manipulator systems have to do with the effects of
system failures on the crew or vehicle. Operational
limitations of use are placed on robotic systems
that may otherwise be perfectly capable of
performing their Intended operations. Limitations
on use are Imposeddue to the fact that if a system
is performinga task and were to have a failure, the
effect of that failure must not prohibit the intended
function from being performed in the time frame
that function is critically needed, and any failure
must not prohibit any other safety related
operations from being carded out during its time of
criticality.
For a systemto continue operations after a failure,
any remaining operability the system might contain
must also providethat same capabilityto make itself
safe to the vehicle and crew if it were to suffer a
failure. Otherwise that additionallevel of operability
would only be allowed for temporary use to make
the task situation safe, remove the robot from the
task area, and then stow It in a safe returnable state
or eject it so the vehicle can return to Earth. The
added operability would not be allowed for
continued use to proceed with the intended task,
except to make the situation safe. This is the
fundamental concept of hazard control for the
Orbiter.
FTS Fail Safe Operations
Several FTS configuration descriptions follow
below along with design features to address key
functions which allow for safe operations. The
designs comply with NASA's Orbiter safety policy
and requirements of NSTS 1700.7B with
interpretedin NSTS 18798A. In several cases, the
hardware or software system could not be
designed to meet the required levels of fault
tolerance without significantly complicating the
design or dexterity of the manipulator system.
Therefore reductions in compliance with the safety
requirements placed operational limitations on the
use of the FTS System. The system Is considered
fail safe;where under any failurethe systemwill not
cause a catastrophic hazard, and therefore does
not jeopardize the safety of the Orbiter or crew.
The FTS system is not fail-operational. Such a
system, after any initial failure, could continue
normal intended operations since it would still
retain the ability to make itself safe after a second
failure.
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The DTF-1 concept fulfills the first method of
hazard control for Orbiter safety using its normal
modes of operation. If any of the single points of
failure occur, normal operations will cease and an
attempt to safe the manipulator system by usa of
the hardwlred control. Note that hardwlred control
is only a supplement to the first level of hazard
control. If the manipulator system cannot be safed
by use of the hardwire control, the mission will be
assessed to determine if enough time remains to
perform an EVA to safe the manipulator system. If
hardwlred control cannot safe the manipulator
system and time does not permit an EVA to safe
the manipulator or remove It for stowage, then the
RMS will grapple the telerobot using the RMS
grapple fixture for jettison. This Is the second
method for hazard control. The third method of
hazard control to provide two fault tolerance for
Orbiter safety is EVA operations. Remedial
operations could be to remove the manipulator,
release the gripper and/or release the actuator
brakes. This would be to allow stowage of the
manipulator, either into its caging devices or by
removal and strapping it in the aidock, or otherwise
by release into orbit.
Hardwlrod Control
The FTS system Incorporates a backup hardwlred
control capability In the event of a failure which
precludes closed loop computer control of the
manipulator system. The main purpose is to
minimize the likelihood of having to jettison the
system or perform an EVA operation. This has the
effect of making the computer system, sensor
systems, software, servo systems and most other
hardware single fault tolerant, even though the
operations would be significantly degraded In
performance.
Operational use of the hardwired control is limited
to sating of the system after a failure, by stowing
the arm to allow a safe Orbiter retum. It allows
operator control of individual manipulator joints for
stowage and for gripper actuation In the event of
computer control or motor drive failure. When
selected, primary power Is removed from all
manipulator motor and brake ddvers while retaining
power to camera controls. Software recognizes
the status of the hardwire control, and commands
off all motors and brakes, so that retum to normal
computer operations after hardwired control starts
with all motors and brakes powered off.
Hardwlre controlis limitedto very lowjoint rates and
torques. Hardwired control is by sequential, joint-
by-joint movement, and provides no force
accommodation to minimlze forces Imparfed into
interfaces. Only a limited set of initiated tasks are
likely to be able to be completed. Emergency
shutdown detection (ESD) is not operational
during hardwired control operation, as the operator
can de-power the hardwired ddve to stop payload
motion, and brakes can also be used to stop
motion.
Several failures of components employ EVA as the
third hazard control path to ensure stowage of
DTF-1 for safe return of the Orbiter. The
manipulator actuators, gdpper mechanism, and
manipulator caging mechanisms represent major
groups of such components.
Failure of a caging mechanism to release the arm
for operation would not require EVA for safing the
manipulator. EVA would be used as the third path
for sating the manipulator if more than one of the
four caging mechanism fail to close. In this case,
removal of the manipulator at its shoulder Interface
and either manual release into orbit or stowage in
the aidock would be required.
Failure of a manipulator actuator motor ddve
electrically or mechanically would require EVA as
the thirdcontrolled path. Mechanical release of the
joint actuator brake allows EVA backdrive of the
joint into the caging position, if a manipulator joint
seizes, then EVA is employed as the third hazard
control path to remove the manipulator at the
shoulder and release Into orbit or stowage In the
airlock.
Sinale-Points Failures:
There are several singlepoint failures that remain in
the FTS system which may lead to failure of the
manipulatorto complete a task, or to stow itself for a
safe Orbiter return. For the Orbiter this is
considered a catastrophic hazardl therefore the
requirements for payloads to provide two fault
tolerant methods of dealing with these effects.
The FTS single-pointfailures which lead to an EVA
or jettison are few In function, but have
commonaltywithinthe actuator and gripper. These
failures are seized bearings orgears, a shortwithin
the motor winding, or a short or open In a brake
winding.
Safety Critical Subsystems
The DTF-1 Flight Experiment of FTS has fifteen
different safety crltical subsystems and equipment
groups, as listed:
Structure Subsystem, Manipulator, Controls, Data
Management and Processing, Vision, Sensors,
Software, End-of-Arm Tooling, Electrical, Power,
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Electromechanical Devices, Thermal Control, Task
Panel Elements, Aft Deck Workstation, and Hand
Controllers
_,ut..umL_3atu=
The flight FTS manipulator assembly and initial
tests were completed under the FTS Technology
Capture program at Martin Marietta Astronautics,
Denver, in July 1993. An acceptance test and
demonstration occurred July 28, 1993, with NASA
participation by JSC and LaRC. The tests were
conducted on an air-bearing table with all seven
joints active, but only four commanded to move for
joint and coordinated Cartesian control. The joint
servo controller loops had not been individual
tuned, and therefore this testing constituted only a
demonstration of operation, rather than a
performance test. Contact stability and variable
compliance interactions with external structures
were also demonstrated. The servo tuning can be
readily accomodated, as all parameters are
programmable, including the torque loop
frequency responses.
A follow-on effort called the Bridge Task integrated
and checked-out the flight End-of-Arm Tooling
(EOAT or gripper) and wrist camera onto the flight
manipulator. The Mil-Std-1553B communications
bus underwent performance tests between the
three internal arm control computers and external
coordinating controllers. Martin Marietta provided
engineering assessments for a proposed flight
experiment concept that Separated the
manipulator arm from the main avionics. The
integrated safety design and control of the system
was meticulously maintained. All engineering,
analysis, data files and article data packages are
being completed and documented under the
guidance of Martin Marietta's QA and NASA's
SR&QA to maintain the flight heritage of the
manipulator and components.
NASA FIIoht Plans
JSC developed an Orbiter based flight experiment
concept to demonstrate a dexterous robotic
manipulator system that can operate on the end of
the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS).
This configuration was recommended by Shuttle
payload and operations managers as the most
useful and beneficial, as opposed to a relocateable
dexterous device only. The operational uses allow
planned payload manipulation tasks and provides a
capability for contingency operations for payloads
and for some Orbiter problems. The benefit is to
minimize overall EVA time currently consumed by
routine tasks, such as EVA site setup and
takedown. This would allow EVA to be most
usefully allocated for complex operations. Langley
Research Center and JPL are team participants in
this proposed venture, called DOSS for Dexterous
Orbiter Servicing System. Langley would be
responsible for advanced robotic controls
development and JPL for advanced operator
control from a ground control station.
The other significant function of DOSS includes
ground control of the dexterous manipulator using
3-D graphic simulations in predictive displays to
compensate for the time delays. Ground control
allows multiple rotations of ground controllers to
operate the dexterous manipulator. The flight
experiment concept is cost effective, in that the
most expensive development item, the flight
manipulator, is available and can be capitalized on.
The manipulator along with all ancillary avionics and
mechanisms were designed to meet the integrated
and operational Orbiter payload safety
requirements. Such a flight experiment would
provide significant risk mitigation for robotic
applications in space, e.g. the new space station,
since much of its maintenance is now baselined
with the use of ground controlled robotics. The
station program seems to be counting on
dexterous robotics with no flight operations time to
provide insight into possible complications.
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